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I. INTRODUCTIONS HOULD a person who has made expenditures before entering into
a contract be able to recover those expenditures as an element of
damages if that contract is breached? This question does not arise
in those breach of contract actions where either expectation or restitution
damages are awarded. It can arise, however, in cases where the court
elects to award reliance damages.
The conventional wisdom among commentators is that it is inappropri-
ate to allow recovery of pre-contractual expenditures as part of a reliance
interest-based award,' and that the courts, at least in the United States,
have generally accepted this proposition and denied such recovery. 2
Closer inquiry reveals, however, that a persuasive argument can be made
for allowing recovery of pre-contractual expenditures under the reliance
interest rubric, so long as it was in the reasonable contemplation of the
contracting parties that those expenditures would be wasted in the event
of breach. Moreover, there is some support to be found in the United
States case law-and quite substantial support in the British Common-
wealth case law-for doing so. This article will present and evaluate that
argument as well as review and reassess the relevant case law in light of
it.3
Part II of this article will briefly summarize the basic principles gov-
erning the award of damages for breach of contract. Part III will set forth
the argument for allowing recovery of pre-contractual expenditures as an
element of reliance damages awards. Part IV will review the British
1. See, e.g., 5 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRicrs § 1034 (1950) ("It is to be
observed also that expenses incurred in inducing the making of the contract are not [recov-
erable] expenses in preparation and part performance.... They are caused neither by the
breach of the contract nor by its making."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACrs 928 (2d
ed. 1990) ("[Reliance damages] will not help the injured party who has done nothing in
reliance on the contract."); Mark Pettit, Private Advantage and Public Power: Reexamining
the Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, 38 HAST. L.J. 417, 425 (1987)
("Reliance damages would cover only expenditures incurred after the promise was
made."). See also J. E. Macy, Annotation, Right to Recover, in Action for Breach of Con-
tract, Expenditure Incurred in Preparation for Performance, 17 A.L.R.2D 1300 (1951).
For expenditures incurred before the actual making of the contract, a defend-
ant is not liable unless he is affirmatively shown to have assumed responsibil-
ity for them. The action is based upon the contract and can include only
losses sustained as a consequence of it. The rule applies even if the expendi-
tures were incurred directly for the purpose for which the plaintiff made the
contract ....
ld at 1314.
2. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 928 n.2 ("It has.., been held [by United States
courts] that an injured party cannot recover for costs incurred before that party made the
contract."); A. I. OGus, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 349 (1973) ("American authorities have
rejected claims for pre-contract expenditure.").
3. This article will not consider the related issue of liability for expenditures or other
conduct carried out in anticipation of a later contract that is never entered into. For an
extensive discussion of the liability issues raised by failed negotiations, see generally E.
Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and
Failed Negotiations, 87 COL. L. REv. 217 (1987).
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Commonwealth and United States case law relating to this question. In
Part V, I will propose and discuss in detail a "reasonable contemplation"
standard for resolving claims for recovery of pre-contractual expenditures
and reassess the case law in light of this standard. Part VI will present a
brief conclusion.
II. BASIC CONTRACT LAW DAMAGES PRINCIPLES
The usual award sought by a plaintiff in a breach of contract action is
expectation damages: the sum needed to put him in the position he would
have been in had all parties to the contract fully performed their obliga-
tions.4 When expectation damages are awarded, there is no need to de-
termine whether the plaintiff has made pre-contractual expenditures in
anticipation of the contract. The plaintiff is entitled to the value of the
defendant's promised performance, less any costs that the plaintiff has
avoided (or should have avoided) as a result of the defendant's breach. 5
Neither the magnitude nor the timing of the plaintiff's expenditures are
relevant to this calculation except to the extent that they bear upon the
avoidability issue.
Under some circumstances, however, courts will base their awards on a
restitution measure6 or a reliance measure7 of compensation rather than
attempt to protect the plaintiff's expectation interest. Awards of restitu-
tion damages are intended to force the defendant to disgorge his gains
from breach: to return him to the position he occupied at the time the
contract was formed.8 The calculation of restitution damages again does
not require an inquiry into the magnitude or timing of the plaintiff's ex-
penditures, since the focus is exclusively upon the position of the defend-
ant at two different points in time, not upon the situation of the plaintiff.
The award of reliance damages, however, necessitates a different in-
quiry. A reliance damages recovery is intended to protect the plaintiff's
reliance interest: to restore him to the position he occupied at the mo-
ment of contract formation before he commenced to rely upon the de-
fendant's promises.9 Calculation of a reliance damages award requires
determination of the size of the plaintiff's reliance losses, be they expend-
itures or value lost as a result of forgone alternative opportunities. The
amount of the plaintiff's expenditures is of course relevant to this inquiry,
as is the question of whether those expenditures were in fact made in
reliance upon the defendant's promises. The timing of those expendi-
tures-whether they were made before or after the formation of the con-
tract-would appear to be directly relevant to the question of whether
they were made in reliance upon the promise and therefore recoverable.
4. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 40.
5. Id. at 896.
6. Id. at 843.
7. Id at 842.
8. Id at 843.
9. Id at 842.
1995]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Similarly, the value of any opportunities forgone in reliance upon the
contract, and the timing of those choices, would appear to be relevant to
the reliance inquiry.
The goal in awarding reliance damages is to restore the plaintiff to the
position he was in at the moment of contract formation.10 Two corol-
laries derive from this basic proposition. First, the plaintiff should be en-
titled to recover not only his expenditures made in reliance upon the
defendant's promise, but also the value of any opportunities that he has
forgone in reliance upon the contract." Revenues forgone are economi-
cally equivalent to expenditures, and the complete restoration of a plain-
tiff to his pre-contractual position requires not only the reimbursement of
his expenditures but also compensation for his forgone opportunities.' 2
Secondly, it would appear to be inappropriate to allow compensation
for any pre-contractual expenditures, or for the value of any opportuni-
ties pre-contractually forgone, as part of a reliance damages award.' 3
Any expenditures or other changes of position made before a contract is
formed may well take place in anticipation of that contract, but would
have occurred even if the anticipated contract never results.14 Rather
than characterize those pre-contractual expenditures or other acts as hav-
ing been made in reliance upon the later contract, it is more reasonable to
regard them as having been made only on the basis of the plaintiff's
hopeful expectations.' 5 It consequently seems unfair, under a reliance-
based theory of recovery, to burden the defendant with the responsibility
for the plaintiff's pre-contractual conduct.
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR ALLOWING RECOVERY OF PRE-
CONTRACTUAL EXPENDITURES AS AN ELEMENT
OF RELIANCE DAMAGES
The position generally taken by commentators that recovery of pre-
contractual expenditures should not be allowed as an element of reliance
damages' 6 thus seems on its face to have a very solid foundation. Given
10. Id.
11. Lon Fuller & William Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 55, 60 (1936); Michael Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
1992 Wis. L. REv. 1755, 1761 ("The reliance interest must include some measure of the
opportunities the plaintiff gave up in order to enter into the contract with the defendant.").
12. Kelly, supra note 11, at 1761.
13. Pettit, supra note 1, at 425 n.31 ("Reliance expenditures made before the promise
•.. theoretically would not be recoverable since they would have been made even if the...
[promisor] had never made the promise ....
14. Id.
15. Pre-contractual expenditures
are not made in reliance upon the contract and can not be said to be a loss
caused by breach of the contract, as the sums were expended whether or not
a contract ultimately came into existence. It is not logical that such expenses
should change their nature and become recoverable damages (in the event of
breach) at the time the contract is signed.
David P. Grinlinton, Damages for Wasted Expenditures in Contracts for the Sale of Land, 5
AUCKLAND U. L. REv. 37, 46-47 (1984).
16. See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 1, at 425 n.31.
[Vol. 49
PRE-CONTRACTUAL EXPENDITURES
this fact, it is not surprising that the oft-repeated assertion that the case
law supports this position 17 has not been subjected to close scrutiny.
The matter is not, however, quite as simple as it first appears. There
are situations which raise complications that call into question the simple
logic set forth above, and a close review of the case law reveals an uneasy
grappling with those problems. I am of the opinion that the better rule of
law is that under certain circumstances pre-contractual expenditures
should be recoverable as an element of reliance damages, and that the
case law-particularly the British Commonwealth case law, but also one
line of American cases-provides substantial support for this position. In
my view, those expenditures should be recoverable when all of the fol-
lowing elements are satisfied:
1) when it is in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the
contract, at the time of contract formation, that those expenditures
will likely be wasted in the event of breach, and
2) when the recovery of those expenditures does not conflict with
any of the standard foreseeability, avoidability, certainty, or "losing
contact" limitations on recovery, and
3) when such recovery has not been precluded by the agreement of
the parties.
Let me develop the argument in support of this position in the follow-
ing Sections of this Part.
A. THE PROBLEM OF INADEQUATE COMPENSATION FOR LOST
OPPORTUNITIES IN RELIANCE DAMAGES AWARDS
Restoring a plaintiff to the position he occupied at the time of contract
formation requires, in theory, compensating him for the value of opportu-
nities forgone in reliance upon the contract as well as for his expendi-
tures. As a practical matter, however, it is a rare reliance damages award
that includes any compensation whatever for lost opportunities. 18 The
usual circumstance in which reliance damages are awarded is where the
plaintiff cannot establish his lost profits with the requisite degree of cer-
tainty required for an expectation interest-based recovery.19 Denied the
opportunity to recover the benefit of his bargain, he will then generally
elect to attempt to recover reliance damages sufficient to restore him to
his pre-contractual position. When attempting to establish the value of
the alternative opportunities forgone in reliance upon the contract, how-
ever, he will almost always founder on the same lack-of-certainty difficul-
17. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 928 n.2.
18. "[Tlhe law has not generally recognized yet another kind of reliance-reliance
that consists in forgoing opportunities.... [C]ourts have not been receptive to claims based
on this kind of reliance." FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 267.
19. Id. at 928. Somewhat surprisingly, courts rarely award reliance damages in those
breach of contract actions decided under the authority of § 90 of the Restatement (Second)




ties that rendered him ineligible for an expectation damages award. 20
The profits that would have been earned through a particular alternative
contractual arrangement will, as a general matter, be at least as specula-
tive as those claimed (and rejected) under the contract that was
breached.21 There exist, moreover, the added uncertainties concerning
the identity of the party with whom this alternative contract would have
been made, if such an alternative contract would have been entered into
at all, and what its terms would have been.
The plaintiff who receives a reliance damages award will thus usually
recover only his reliance expenditures. 22 To the extent that profits would
have been made on the contract if it had not been breached, or on an
alternative contract if the plaintiff had not relied upon the defendant's
promises, such a reliance damages award undercompensates the plaintiff.
B. ALLOWING RECOVERY OF PRE-CONTRACTUAL EXPENDITURES AS
A PROXY FOR THE VALUE OF FORGONE OPPORTUNITIES
Courts doubtless recognize that when reliance damages are awarded
subject to the usual certainty limitations, the result is systematic un-
dercompensation of plaintiffs (albeit variable in magnitude) for their lost
opportunities. They are, however, restrained by these limitations from
directly recognizing and compensating for such intangible losses. One
way in which judges have responded to this problem is by avoiding it and
awarding expectation damages even under circumstances where it may be
more appropriate to protect the plaintiff's reliance interest. This ten-
dency is documented by a recent article that reveals that, when courts
enforce relied-upon promises under the authority of Section 90 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts,23 they almost invariably do so by
awarding expectation damages rather than reliance interest-based
awards.24 This is somewhat surprising, given that the basis for the en-
forcement of promises under Section 90 is reliance rather than mutual
agreement, 25 and given that Section 90 includes an express invitation to
judges to limit the remedy granted to a reliance interest-based recovery
20. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 921-28. "[R]eliance becomes even more difficult to
value than expectation in precisely those cases in which courts seek an alternative to the
difficult expectation measure." Pettit, supra note 1, at 457. The fact that reliance damage
awards, in practice, generally compensate only for expenditures and not for the value of
lost opportunities has recently come under scrutiny and criticism. See, e.g., Kelly, supra
note 11.
21. Pettit, supra note 1, at 457.
22. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 843. "In practice, courts employing the reliance
measure generally restrict themselves to out-of-pocket losses (disregarding the concept of
lost opportunity) .... Pettit, supra note 1, at 454.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
24. "[T]he remedy courts routinely grant under Section 90 is specific performance or
(if feasible) expectation damages. Cases granting less than expectancy relief are relatively
rare .... Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J.
111, 112-13 (1991).
25. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
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where justice so requires. 26 One explanation that has been advanced for
this failure of courts to make greater use of reliance interest-based reme-
dies in Section 90 litigation is continuing judicial adherence to the classic
Willistonian position that promises are to be enforced either fully or not
at all.27 This is the primary explanation endorsed by Edward Yorio and
Steve Thel in their important article on the subject.28 Other explanations,
however, are also possible. It may well be that the courts have moved
beyond the views held by Williston and do now accept the principle em-
braced by Section 90 that it may be appropriate in some circumstances to
limit the remedy available for the breach of promises that are enforceable
only because of promisee reliance to reliance damages. The judges likely
also understand, however, that reliance damages as awarded in practice
fail fully to protect plaintiffs' reliance interests because of their failure to
reflect the value of forgone opportunities. This recognition of the practi-
cal shortcomings of reliance damages awards, rather than continuing ad-
herence to Willistonian conceptions of the source and nature of
contractual obligations, may be the primary factor that underlies judicial
reluctance to award reliance damages wherever expectation damages can
be established with reasonable certainty. It may also be the primary fac-
tor that limits the use of the reliance damages remedy primarily to those
cases that raise serious questions as to the certainty of the losses
alleged.29
In my view, given the asymmetric, pro-defendant bias in the operation
of the certainty limitations as applied to reliance damages awards, courts
should, in the interest of achieving substantial justice, be receptive to new
legal doctrines that would allow them partially or wholly to correct for
the undercompensation problem where it cannot be otherwise avoided.
In particular, they should try to give force in their reliance damages
awards to any tangible evidence submitted by the plaintiff as to funds
expended and wasted in connection with the breached contract, even if
those expenditures took place before the moment of contract formation
and therefore do not fit precisely into the traditional "reliance"
categories.
I concede that recovery of pre-contractual expenditures (or of the
value of pre-contractually forgone opportunities) would have no proper
place in a theoretically sound reliance damages award that compensated
the plaintiff for his post-contractual forgone opportunities as well as for
his post-contractual reliance expenditures. Such a comprehensive award
26. Id.
27. "Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it has to be
enforced as it is made.... [T]he question of damages for breach of a promise is ordinarily
such a sum as will put the promisee in as good a position as he would have been in if the
promise had been kept, not as good a position as he would have been in if the promise had
not been made .... " Proceedings at Fourth Annual Meeting, 4 A.L.I. PROC. 103, 111-12
(1926) (statements of Samuel Williston).
28. Yorio & Thel, supra note 24, at 114-15, 132-36.
29. See generally Fuller & Perdue, supra note 11, at 60-62; JOHN MURRAY, MURRAY
ON CoNRAcrs 281-84 (3d ed. 1990).
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would fully restore the plaintiff to his pre-contractual position. We live,
however, in an imperfect world that sometimes requires second-best solu-
tions, and allowing compensation for at least certain kinds of pre-contrac-
tual expenditures will in practice bring us closer to the goal of making
disappointed promisees whole, since such compensation will augment re-
liance damages awards that otherwise now systematically undercompen-
sate promisees because they fail to allow recovery for the value of
opportunities forgone in reliance upon the contracts. 30
C. APPROPRIATE LIMrrS ON ALLOWING RECOVERY OF PRE-
CONTRACTUAL EXPENDITURES AS A PROXY FOR THE VALUE
OF FORGONE OPPORTUNITIES
Even if one recognizes that allowing recovery of pre-contractual ex-
penditures could enable courts to make awards that generally come
closer to providing full protection of promisees' reliance interests than do
current reliance damages awards that effectively ignore the value of post-
contractually forgone opportunities, one should be hesitant to embrace a
principle that would allow expanded recovery unless its application can
be properly limited to appropriate circumstances. This new principle of
recovery appears at first glance to be relatively expansive and uncon-
strained. Once one deems the plaintiff's pre-contractual expenditures
relevant for damages calculation purposes, there is no immediately obvi-
ous limit to the breadth of the defendant's exposure. How "far back"
before the time of contracting, and how "far away" from his contractual
obligations, will the plaintiff be allowed to go in ascribing responsibility
for his expenses to the defendant on the basis of his "reliance" on the
contract? One must recognize the concern that, once one allows reliance
damages awards to cover expenditures that occurred before the event
purportedly relied upon, it may prove difficult properly to limit the scope
of pre-contractual expenditures that can qualify as compensable reliance.
I would like to argue, however, that there are in fact some reasonable and
feasible limitations that can be placed upon this expanded conception of
reliance damages that will allow for recovery of pre-contractual expendi-
tures only where doing so will mitigate the undercompensation problem,
without going to the other extreme of overcompensating plaintiffs and
placing unfair burdens upon defendants.
I would like to begin by reviewing the relevant case law to identify
what categories of pre-contractual expenses have been allowed as ele-
ments of reliance damages awards, and under what circumstances. I will
30. In accord is Pettit, supra note 1, at 425 n.31.
As a practical matter, if a court is unwilling or unable to compensate the
plaintiff for opportunities lost as a result of contracting with the defendant, it
may make sense at least to award compensation for precontractual expendi-
tures on the grounds that had the defendant not made her promise the plain-




propose a principle for use as a criterion for making this determination-
a "Reasonable Contemplation" standard-and will then discuss its fea-
tures and apply it to the facts of the cases to determine how its use would
have affected the results reached.
IV. THE CASE LAW
The case law concerning the recovery of pre-contractual expenditures
as an element of reliance damages has developed along two independent
lines that are surprisingly divergent. The British Commonwealth courts
have over the past few decades been quite receptive to claims for recov-
ery of pre-contractual expenditures. The American courts, in contrast,
have been relatively hostile to such claims, although there are a few cases
allowing recovery. Let me first trace the development of the Common-
wealth case law, and then turn to the United States opinions.
A. THE COMMONWEALTH CASES
Before 1971 courts in the Commonwealth countries had long embraced
the principle that pre-contractual expenditures could not be recovered as
an element of a reliance damages award,31 except under a very narrow
exception. This exception originated in the 1850 English case of Hanslip
v. Padwick,32 which allowed the plaintiff to recover his pre-contractual
expenses of investigating title in an action for a breach of a contract to
convey land. 33 This limited exception was extended slightly almost a cen-
tury later in the English case of Wallington v. Townsend,34 which also al-
lowed recovery of the pre-contractual expenditures incurred for the legal
costs of approving and executing a subsequently breached contract to
convey land. 35
In 1971, this narrow exception was substantially enlarged, albeit still
within the land conveyance context, by the ruling in the English case of
Lloyd v. Stanbury.3 6 There the plaintiff and defendant had reached an
informal agreement under which the defendant would convey a parcel of
land, and as part of that agreement the plaintiff had agreed to provide a
31. See, e.g., Hodges v. Earl of Litchfield, 131 Eng. Rep. 1207, 1209 (1835) ("The ex-
penses preliminary to the contract ought not to be allowed. The party enters into them for
his own benefit at a time when it is uncertain whether there will be any contract or not.").
See also Perestrello & Companhia Limitada v. United Paint Co. Ltd., 113 Sol. J. 324, 329
(1969) (Eng.) (denying recovery of pre-contractual expenditures incurred after the execu-
tion of a non-binding agreement in principle: "[In my judgment] precontract expenditure,
though thrown away, is not recoverable.").
32. 5 Ex. 615, 155 Eng. Rep. 269 (1850). David Grinlinton has suggested that this
exception may have its historical roots in the fact that the investigation of title in early
nineteenth-century England generally took place after the contract was made, and such
expenses were therefore obviously recoverable. Once title investigation became more gen-
erally a pre-contractual practice, the courts chose to maintain continuity and continued to
allow recovery of those expenses. Grinlinton, supra note 15, at 49.
33. Hanslip, 5 Ex. at 615.
34. 1 Ch. 588 (1939).
35. Id.
36. 1 W.L.R. 535 (Ch. 1971) (Eng.).
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caravan 37 for the use of the defendant that would be placed on the prop-
erty until the defendant had completed a bungalow on an adjoining par-
cel retained for that purpose. The plaintiff subsequently had his caravan
moved onto the parcel for the defendant's use. This was done five days
before the signing of a formal contract of sale that gave the prior agree-
ment legal force and that included a term making the provision of the
caravan a contractual duty of the plaintiff. The defendant subsequently
breached the contract, and the plaintiff sought to obtain a reliance inter-
est-based recovery that included, among other items of damages, his pre-
contractual conveyancing expenses and the costs he had incurred before
the signing of the contract to move the caravan to the site. The Lloyd
court allowed recovery of both the conveyancing and moving expenses,
stating:
In my judgment the damages which [the plaintiff] ... is entitled to
recover include expenditure incurred prior to the contract represent-
ing (1) legal costs of approving and executing the contract and (2)
costs of performing an act .required to be done by the contract
notwithstanding that the act is performed in anticipation of the exe-
cution of the contract. In addition, the buyer is entitled on general
principles to damages for any other loss which ought to be regarded
as within the contemplation of the parties. 38
The final sentence quoted above, though perhaps properly regarded as
mere dicta since it was made in a case involving only claims for recovery
of conveyancing costs and subsequently required expenditures in the land
contract context, obviously suggests the possibility of extending the al-
lowance of pre-contractual expenditures well beyond that context, and
beyond those expense categories. That implicit suggestion was soon em-
braced in the celebrated English Court of Appeal case of Anglia Televi-
sion Ltd. v. Reed.39
The plaintiff in Anglia had contracted with Robert Reed, a well-known
actor, to play the leading role in a television play. Prior to entering into
this contract, the plaintiff had made expenditures for a director, a de-
signer, and a stage manager for the play. Reed subsequently repudiated
the contract, and the plaintiff, unable to locate a suitable replacement,
sued for breach. Choosing not to attempt to recover lost profits because
of their speculative character, the plaintiff instead sought a reliance inter-
est-based recovery of its wasted expenditures, including its pre-contrac-
tual expenditures.
The Anglia court allowed the plaintiff a judgment for the full amount
claimed.40 After noting that a plaintiff was entitled to elect to recover his
37. "Caravan" is a British term for a mobile home.
38. Lloyd, 1 W.L.R. at 546. The Lloyd court failed to discuss (or even cite) the contra
position taken two years earlier in Perestrello & Companhia Limitada v. United Paint Co.
Ltd., 113 Sol. J. 324 (1969) (Eng.) (discussed supra note 31).
39. 1 Q.B. 60 (C.A. 1972).
40. Id. at 64.
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wasted expenditures rather than to seek lost profits,41 the court stated
broadly:
If the plaintiff claims the wasted expenditure, he is not limited to the
expenditures incurred after the contract was concluded. He can also
claim the expenditure incurred before the contract, provided that it
was such as would reasonably be in the contemplation of the parties
as likely to be wasted if the contract was broken .... This decision is
in accord with the correct principle, namely, that wasted expendi-
tures can be recovered when it is wasted by reason of the defendant's
breach of contract. It is true that, if the defendant had never entered
into the contract, he would not be liable, and the expenditure would
have been incurred by the plaintiff without redress, but, the defend-
ant having made his contract and broken it, it does not lie in his
mouth to say he is not liable, when it was because of his breach that
the expenditure was wasted.42
While the Anglia decision has received mixed reviews from commenta-
tors,4 3 it has been followed or at least cited approvingly by all of the
Commonwealth opinions that have referred to it,44 with one possible ex-
ception.45 For example, in the English case of C.C.C. Films (London)
Ltd. v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd.,46 the court allowed the plaintiff to
recover $12,000, a sum that it had previously expended under a prior con-
tract with the defendant to obtain a license to exhibit three motion pic-
tures, as wasted expenditures in an action for breach of a second,
subsequent contract to deliver copies of those films to the plaintiff.47
Two additional interesting cases applying the Anglia standard were de-
cided in New Zealand. In the unreported 1983 opinion of O'Connell v.
Hay48 the defendant had repudiated a contract to sell his farm. The
plaintiff then sued seeking to recover his wasted expenditures. The
41. Id. at 63-64.
42. Id at 64 (emphasis in original).
43. See, e.g., D. W. McLauchlan, Damages for Pre-Contract Expenditure, 11 N.Z.U.
L.R. 346, 351-54 (1985) (discussing Anglia approvingly and at length); Grinlinton, supra
note 15, at 48-50 (criticizing Anglia); A. I. Keesing, Pre-Contract Expenses-An Equitable
Decision?, 1983 N.Z. REC. L. REv. 296 (1983) (criticizing Anglia); A. I. Ogus, Note, Dam-
ages for Pre-Contract Expenditure, 35 MODERN L.R. 423 (1973) (criticizing Anglia).
44. See, e.g., C.C.C. Films (London) Ltd. v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd., 1 Q.B. 16
(1985) (Eng.) (see infra text accompanying note 46); Fieling v. Newell, 1986 Outer House
Cases (Sess. Nov. 28, 1986) (Scot.) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, Scocas file) ("I am not satisfied
that this claim should be restricted to expenditure incurred after the contract was con-
cluded. The description given by the pursuer of these items does not suggest to me that
they would not be in the reasonable contemplation of the parties as likely to be wasted if
the contract was broken.") (citing Anglia in support). See also Bloom (Kosher) & Sons
Ltd. v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 35 P.& C.R. 423 (1977) (Eng.) (citing Anglia
with approval); McLauchlan, supra note 43, at 360 (citing O'Connell v. Hay, Dunedin Reg-
istry, A.48/82 (Feb. 4, 1983) (N.Z.) (Cook, J.) and following Anglia) (see infra text accom-
panying note 48).
45. McLauchlan, supra note 43, at 375 (citing Ash v. Victor Enters., Auckland Regis-
try, A.591/70 (Aug. 5, 1974) (N.Z.) (Cooke, J.)). See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
46. 1 Q.B. 16 (1985).
47. Id.




O'Connell court held, on the authority of Anglia, that pre-contractual ex-
penditures that the defendant could reasonably contemplate would be
wasted as a consequence of breach were recoverable.49
In the other unreported New Zealand case the court recognized the
authority of Anglia but distinguished that case as inapplicable to the facts
before it.50 Ash v. Victor Enterprises,5' however, can also be reasonably
read as an implicit repudiation of the rationale of the Anglia opinion.
The plaintiff there had resigned a position to accept a contract of employ-
ment with another employer. By resigning that position he forfeited his
right eventually to receive over $4000 of superannuation payments from
that former employer. Later, in an action for the breach of the second
employment contract, the plaintiff sought to recover the value of that for-
gone superannuation payment. The Ash court denied recovery of this
sum, distinguishing the Anglia precedent as inapplicable.5 2
The Ash opinion on its face appears to stand for the proposition that
the scope of recoveries allowed under Anglia is properly limited to pre-
contractual expenditures, and that Anglia does not support allowing re-
covery of the value of pre-contractually forgone opportunities. Whether
a meaningful distinction can be drawn, however, between Anglia-type
pre-contractual expenditures and pre-contractually forgone :evenues is
debatable.53 Expenditures and forgone revenues are economically
equivalent. In both Anglia and Ash the promisee chose to make a finan-
cial sacrifice in relation to and in anticipation of a future contract, the
sacrifice being wasted upon the defendant's breach, and this wastage be-
ing in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of con-
tracting as a likely consequence of breach. Consequently, the Ash ruling
should perhaps not be viewed as merely distinguishing Anglia, but read
more broadly as an implicit rejection of the core principle of Anglia.
49. Id.
[T]here seems no reason why expenditure incurred prior to the signing of the
contract which is of a type which would normally be incurred as part of the
process leading to the formalisation of the bargain and, as such, could be
contemplated by the other party, should not be recoverable.
Id.
50. Ash v. Victor Enters., Auckland Registry, A.591/70 (Aug. 5, 1974) (Cooke, J.),
cited in McLauchlan, supra note 43, at 357.
51. Id.
52. Id.
It seems to me that the plaintiff's claim must fail in that the forgoing in part
of his former superannuation right was not caused by the defendant's breach
of contract. The Anglia case is distinguishable because there was in that case
nothing equivalent to the election in this case to abandon one contract for
another, and because the present is not a case of pre-contract expenditure for
the purpose of carrying out a proposed contract. In truth the plaintiff's loss
of superannuation here is due to his judgment in accepting a position with
the defendant in the first place, rather than to anything that happened later.
Id. (quoted from Ash opinion by McLauchlan, supra note 43, at 358).
53. McLauchlan, supra note 43, at 358-59; Note, Contract Law-Damages-Pre-con-
tractual Expenditure, 1975 N.Z.LJ. 29, 30 ("Whether Anglia TV v. Reed is so easily distin-
guishable is an open question.").
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B. THE UNITED STATES CASES
There were early intimations in the United States case law of judicial
disfavor of recovery of pre-contractual expenditures. There were, for ex-
ample, two cases-decided in 1834 and 1850, respectively-that each de-
nied recovery of pre-contractual expenditures as part of an expectation
interest-based award.54 The rulings in those cases, however, were each
phrased in relatively broad language that suggested that a plaintiff might
not be allowed to recover pre-contractual expenditures even if he sought
only to protect his reliance interest.55 TWo other similar late-1800s cases
were subsequently decided, one of which again denied recovery of pre-
contractual contract procurement expenses sought as part of an expecta-
tion interest-based award. 56 The second denied recovery of pre-contrac-
tual brokerage expenditures under a liquidated damages clause that
directed the defendant to pay all damages "arising from default" of his
vendor obligations under a real estate contract. 57
The first opinion of which I am aware whose holding was a rejection of
recovery of pre-contractual expenditures in the reliance damages context
was the 1893 New York opinion of Steers v. Laird.58 That case involved a
suit by a seller of real estate to recover his pre-contractual brokerage
expenditures as damages for the defendant's breach. The Steers court re-
jected the reasoning of an earlier New York case, Hening v. Punnett,59
that had (without discussion or citation of any authority) allowed such
recovery,60 and denied recovery of the brokerage commissions. 61
54. Stevens v. Lyford, 7 N.H. 360 (1834); Durkee v. Mott, 8 Barb. 422 (N.Y. App. Div.
1850).
55. It is objected, also, that the court instructed the jury, that the plaintiff was
entitled to damages for his trouble in making journies to obtain the con-
tract .... [Expectation damages] was all he would have received, in the ordi-
nary course of business, had the defendant performed his contract .... He
was not, therefore, entitled to recover any thing for the journies he had
made, or the trouble of advancing money ....
Stevens, 7 N.H. at 367.
The time the plaintiff spent in making the contract, is not properly an item in
the assessment of damages. Where there is no fraud, and no express agree-
ment to that effect, I am not aware that any thing antecedent to the closing of
the bargain can be allowed as damages for breaking it. The contract takes
effect from that time.
Durkee, 8 Barb. at 427.
56. Insley v. Shepard, 31 F. 869 (C.C. Ill. 1887).
57. Hubbard v. Epworth, 36 N.W. 801 (Mich. 1888). "It may not be easy to say what
damages can be recovered on a contract terminated by forfeiture; but it is very certain that
defendants have no concern with the compensation paid by the plaintiffs to their own
agents for negotiating the sale." Id. at 803.
58. 23 N.Y.S. 158 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
59. 4 Daly 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873).
60. A later New York opinion noted that "in the case of Hening v. Punnett ... the
court, without discussion or citation of authority, held that... [the plaintiff] was entitled to
recover as damages the commissions which he had [pre-contractually] paid his broker."
Empire Realty Corp. v. Sayre, 107 A.D. 415, 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905).
61. Steers, 23 N.Y.S. at 159.
In general, I do not see a connection between the paying of the commission
and the breach of the contract .... The payment was solely personal to the
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A couple of additional opinions were issued in the decade subsequent
to Steers that involved claims raised in the expectation damages award
context and that again suggested general judicial hostility to recovery of
pre-contractual expenditures. 62 The next major ruling in the reliance
damages context also came from New York and drew heavily upon the
rationale of Steers.63 Empire Realty Corp. v. Sayre64 again involved the
question of recovery of pre-contractual brokerage commissions. After
discussing the matter at some length, the court there concluded that the
Steers court had properly resolved the issue against such recovery and
that the earlier Hening case had been incorrectly decided. 65 A number of
post-Empire decisions handed down during the following quarter-century
closely followed the position taken in the Empire case. 66
The year 1932 was a watershed with regard to the issue of the recover-
ability of pre-contractual expenditures as an element of a reliance dam-
ages award. As previously discussed, the case law before that time was
almost unanimously opposed to allowing such recovery. In that year,
however, two important cases were decided that took opposing positions.
Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey,67 a very visible case involving a na-
tionally-known boxing figure, was decided in a fashion that generally fol-
lowed the prior authority. Security Stove & Manufacturing Co. v.
American Railway Express Co.68 took the opposing position that had
been first adopted in the 1873 Hening case. These two opinions have
been the fount for the subsequent development of two divergent lines of
authority. Each of these two seminal cases, however, involved certain
plaintiffs, and not within, and not touching, the contract relations of the par-
ties. It could not have been claimed if the contract had been performed, and
the nonperformance does not give a right to it.
Id.
62. Halliday v. Lesh, 85 Mo. App. 285 (1900); Peck-Hammond v. Heifner, 33 So. 807
(Ala. 1903).
63. Empire Realty Corp. v. Sayre, 107 A.D. 415 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 377.
Only one case has been called to our attention where the court has enlarged
the measure of damages ... so as to permit recovery which would include
the [pre-contractual] commissions paid to a broker. That is the case of Hen-
ing v. Punnett... [where] the court, without discussion or citation of author-
ity, held that he was entitled to recover as damages the commission which he
had paid his broker.... [In Steers v. Laird, however,] the court held that they
could not recover the commission, and the language of Chief Judge Sedgwick
in that opinion commends itself to us.... [T]he broker's commissions in the
present case ... were paid, not to carry out, but to procure the contract....
The return of the commissions could not have been claimed if the contract
had been performed, and the nonperformance of it does not give a right...
to recover them ....
Id.
66. See, e.g., Curran v. Smith, 149 F. 945 (3d Cir. 1906); Schatzinger Consol. Realty Co.
v. Stonehill, 19 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 403 (1912); Kennedy v. Meilicke Calculator Co., 155 P.
1043 (Wash. 1916); Linde v. Ellis, 6 S.W.2d 1089 (Ky. 1928); Goodall v. Accumulative In-
come Corp., 240 N.W. 534 (Minn. 1932); Odem Realty Co. v. Dyer, 45 S.W.2d 838 (1932).
67. 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932).
68. 51 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
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particular complications that make it difficult to infer a clear legal posi-
tion on this question from the opinion.
Let me discuss these two important cases in some detail. Security Stove
involved a suit for breach of a shipping contract by a common carrier. 69
The plaintiff had sought to exhibit a specially designed oil and gas furnace
at an Atlantic City trade convention. It first incurred expenditures for
the rental of an exhibition booth at the convention. It then wrote the
defendant, stating that it had engaged an exhibition booth, and sought to
arrange timely shipment of the equipment. The parties subsequently con-
tracted for shipment, and the defendant later breached the contract by its
undue delay in delivery. The plaintiff did not seek to recover its lost prof-
its, as they were highly uncertain and speculative, and sought instead to
recover its reliance expenses, including its pre-contractual expenditures
for rental of the exhibition booth. The Security Stove court allowed re-
covery of the pre-contractual outlays,70 stating its view of the matter at
some length:
While it is true that plaintiff already had incurred some of these ex-
penses, in that it had rented space at the exhibit before entering into
the contract with defendant for the shipment of the exhibit and this
part of plaintiff's damages, in a sense, arose out of a circumstance
which transpired before the contract was even entered into, yet,
plaintiff arranged for the exhibit knowing that it could call upon de-
fendant to perform its common law duty to accept and transport the
shipment with reasonable dispatch. The whole damage, therefore,
was suffered in contemplation of defendant performing its contract,
which it failed to do, and would not have been sustained except for
the reliance by plaintiff upon defendant to perform it. It can, there-
fore, be fairly said that the damages or loss suffered by plaintiff grew
out of the breach of the contract, for had the shipment arrived on
time, plaintiff would have had the benefit of the contract, which was
contemplated by all parties, defendant being advised of the purpose
of the shipment.71
One reasonable reading of the Security Stove opinion is that it broadly
endorses recovery of pre-contractual expenditures if it was within the
contemplation of both parties to the contract, at the time of contract for-
mation, that those expenditures would likely be wasted in the event of
breach. This broad reading, however, might be challenged on the basis of
the emphasis given by the opinion to the common-law duties borne by
common carriers.72 One could argue that Security Stove should perhaps
be read more narrowly to endorse recovery of pre-contractual expendi-
tures only where the plaintiff's anticipation of a subsequent contract
when he makes the expenditures is grounded in a recognition that the
other party may, as a common carrier (or for other special reasons), be
69. 1d& at 573.





subject to tort liability should it fail to accept a reasonable offer to
purchase its services. I think the better view, however, is that the exist-
ence of a potential tort claim for breach of the common-law common
carrier duty to serve, should negotiations fail to lead to a contract, is not
relevant to the allocation of responsibility for pre-contractual expendi-
tures should the contract be subsequently made and then breached. I
therefore favor the broader reading of the Security Stove opinion-one
that provides general support for recovery of pre-contractual expendi-
tures, given recognition by the defendant at the time of contracting that
those expenditures would be wasted in the event of breach-as more in
accord with the spirit of the opinion.
The plaintiff in Dempsey73 had entered into a contract with Jack Demp-
sey, at that time the world heavyweight boxing champion, to stage a de-
fense of his title against the challenger, Harry Wills. 74 Prior to entering
into the contract with Dempsey, the plaintiff had first entered into a con-
tract with Wills under which it was to place $50,000 into an escrow ac-
count, to be paid over to Wills ten days before the date of the boxing
contest. Dempsey subsequently repudiated the contract with the plaintiff
in order to engage instead in a (now famous) unsuccessful title defense
against Gene Tunney, another challenger.
The plaintiff sued Dempsey, seeking damages for breach of contract. It
was denied recovery of its expected profits on the ground that they were
too speculative and uncertain.75 The plaintiff further sought to recover its
pre-contractual expenses, i.e., the $50,000 it was obligated to pay to Wills.
The court also denied recovery of this sum. 76 While it did not refer to the
authority of the line of cases supporting Empire, it embraced in substance
the position taken in those precedents, stating as follows:
The action is based upon the written agreement ... [between the
plaintiff and Dempsey]. Any obligations assumed by the plaintiff
prior to that time are not chargeable to the defendant. Moreover, an
examination of the record discloses that the $50,000 named in the
contract with Wills, which was to be payable upon a signing of the
agreement [between the plaintiff and Dempsey], was not and never
has been paid. There is no evidence in the record showing that the
plaintiff is responsible financially, and, even though there were, we
consider that it is not an element of damage which can be recovered
for breach of the contract in question. 77
This case is generally regarded by courts and commentators as standing
for the broad proposition that pre-contractual expenditures are not re-
coverable as an element of reliance damages.78 The Dempsey court's dis-
73. Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 III. App. 542 (1932).
74. Id. at 545.
75. Id at 550.
76. Id. at 551.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Chicago Medical Sch., 354 N.E.2d 586, 591 (I11. App. Ct.
1976) ("[Dempsey] is a leading case for the proposition that expenses incurred during pre-
liminary negotiations to procure a contract are not recoverable as damages."); Moore v.
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cussion of the possibility that those expenditures may not in fact have
been made is thus implicitly regarded as irrelevant dicta. One could,
however, reasonably characterize the rationale of the opinion quite dif-
ferently. The denial of recovery could be regarded as grounded more
narrowly upon the plaintiff's failure to prove its alleged losses, and the
discussion of whether pre-contractual expenditures would be recoverable,
had they been incurred in fact, could be regarded as mere dicta that per-
haps did not reflect full judicial consideration of the question because it
was not crucial to the result reached.
Only a limited number of American opinions have dealt with this ques-
tion since Security Stove and Dempsey were decided in 1932, and most of
them adopt the Empire and Dempsey position,79 although they usually do
not cite either of those supporting opinions directly. For example, in
Gruber v S-M News Co.80 the plaintiff was a manufacturer of greeting
cards that sued a buyer for breach of contract. Unable to sustain a claim
for lost profits, the plaintiff sought to recover his reliance expenditures,
including the funds he had expended prior to the contract to make the
plates from which the cards were printed. The court allowed recovery of
the plaintiff's post-contractual reliance outlays, but denied recovery for
the cost of manufacturing the plates, stating that those costs were not
recoverable because the plates "had already been fabricated prior to
making the contract with defendant." 81
Another opinion that implicitly adopted the Dempsey position is
Hough v. Jay-Dee Realty & Investment, Inc.82 The plaintiff and defend-
ant in that case had entered into a contract under which the plaintiff was
to lease a building from the defendant and operate it as a restaurant.
After entering into a preliminary oral agreement with the defendant, but
before the signing of the formal, legally enforceable contract, the plaintiff
incurred a number of expenses associated with his travel and other activi-
ties intended to establish business relationships with suppliers of food,
fixtures and equipment, and to obtain financing for these later anticipated
purchases. The defendant subsequently breached the contract, and the
plaintiff sought to recover those pre-contractual outlays rather than his
prospective lost profits. The Hough court reduced a prior jury award that
was favorable to the plaintiff so as to deny this element of the claim.83
Lewis, 366 N.E.2d 594, 599 (Ii. App. Ct. 1977) (dicta citing Dempsey for this proposition);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 928 n.2.
79. As the rationale of the Dempsey opinion is conventionally understood; see supra
text accompanying note 78.
80. 126 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
81. 1d. at 446-47. The Gruber opinion did not refer to either the Security Stove or
Dempsey precedents.
82. 401 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
83. 1& at 550.
[W]e have the view that no allowance should have been made for the [ex-
penses incurred during the pre-contractual] period.... Plaintiffs' expendi-
tures during that period were not referable to the contract or its breach.
Expenses incurred during preliminary negotiations are not usually recover-
able in an action for breach of contract ... and in this case they were in-
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Other recent opinions that accept the substance of the Dempsey position,
but that relate back more directly to Empire-type rulings that pre-con-
tractual brokerage commissions are not recoverable, are Manning v.
Pounds8 4 and Cacavas v. Zack.85
There are also, however, several American post-Security Stove cases
that can be read as supporting the position that pre-contractual expendi-
tures may be recoverable. For example, French v. Nabob Silver-Lead
Co.86 involved a dispute concerning a mining lease contract. The plaintiff
had been performing its duties under a prior lease contract with the de-
fendant and sought to obtain a two-year extension of that lease. The de-
fendant made clear during the negotiations for the lease extension that,
due to its own requirements, it would be unable to continue to provide
the plaintiff with compressed air for use in mining operations on the lease
during any extension period. The plaintiff subsequently made arrange-
ments with another mining company for an alternative compressed-air
airline to be installed to access the leased property. Much of the work on
this airline was done while the lease extension was still being negotiated.
The plaintiff and the defendant subsequently entered into a second con-
tract that provided for a two-year lease extension. The defendant
breached this second contract, and the plaintiff sued, seeking to recover
the approximately $1500 it had expended on the construction of the air-
line before that lease extension contract was made. The Idaho Supreme
Court in French allowed recovery of this sum, 87 stating: "The airline was
built in anticipation of a new lease in accordance with the suggestion of
[defendant's] officers. Expenses incurred by a party in anticipation of or
preparation for performance of a contract may be recovered as damages
in an action for a breach thereof. '88
The French opinion is another case that, like Dempsey, is susceptible to
sharply conflicting interpretations as to its proper scope of application.
The opinion can be read broadly as endorsing the recovery of pre-con-
tractual expenditures whenever the defendant can reasonably anticipate
curred before any enforceable obligation arose, since the contract was
required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing.
Id. Neither Security Stove nor Dempsey are cited in this opinion, although the Hough court
does refer for support to the Corbin on Contracts treatise and to a section of the American
Jurisprudence legal encyclopedia, and these cited secondary sources in turn refer to the
above seminal cases. See CoPr.Bn, supra note 1, § 1034; 22 AM. JUR. 2 D Damages § 158.
84. 199 A.2d 188 (Conn. App. Ct. 1963).
85. 203 N.W.2d 913 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972). Cacavas was cited approvingly in a recent
case as standing for the proposition that pre-contractual expenditures are not, in general,
recoverable as damages for breach. Autotrol Corp. v. Continental Water Sys. Corp., 918
F.2d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 1990). Cacavas has also been cited, however, as supporting the
opposite position that pre-contractual expenses are recoverable if within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties, an interpretation that the language of the opinion does not
appear to support. Device Trading Ltd. v. The Viking Corp., 307 N.W.2d 362, 366 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980) ("[pre-contractual expenditures] are not recoverable unless within the rea-
sonable contemplation of the parties").
86. 350 P.2d 206 (Idaho 1960).




at the time of contract formation that they are likely to be wasted as a
result of his breach. Alternatively, given that the parties in French were
already in a prior contractual relationship at the time they were negotiat-
ing the lease extension contract that was subsequently breached, the
opinion can be read more narrowly as endorsing recovery of pre-contrac-
tual expenditures only under the limited circumstance where they are
made while the parties are operating under a prior, closely related con-
tract. The French court's statement of the governing principle in the form
of the hornbook phrase "expenses incurred in anticipation of or prepara-
tion for performance of a contract" ambiguously straddles these two pos-
sibilities. Does the court mean by this phrase to include all pre-
contractual expenses incurred "in anticipation... of a contract," or only
those expenses incurred "in anticipation of ... performance of a con-
tract" once that contract or a closely related prior contract is in force?
Statements made by the same Idaho Supreme Court a quarter-century
later in its opinion in Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur D'Alene, Ltd.89 sug-
gest that the later, narrower interpretation of French is the appropriate
one. The Brown court cites French for the proposition that "damages for
breach of contract may include expenses incurred by a party in anticipa-
tion of or preparation for performance," 90 thus implicitly rejecting the
broader "anticipation ... of a contract" interpretive possibility left open
by French. The Brown case also contains the statement that a reliance
interest-based recovery is available for "all expenses reasonably related
to the purposes of the contract, which would not have been incurred but
for the contract's existence." 91 This "but for" language further suggests
that the Idaho Supreme Court now rejects the principle of recovery of
pre-contractual expenditures, even if grounded in a relationship growing
ouf of a prior, closely-related contract, if in fact it ever consciously em-
braced that principle. 92
An opinion that clearly embraces the Security Stove position is Norton
& Lamphere Construction Co. v. Blow & Cote, Inc.93 In that case the
plaintiff, prior to entering into a contract with the defendant to sell to it
crushed rock, purchased rock crushing and loading equipment for use on
all of its prospective contracts. The defendant did not have any notice at
the time of contracting as to these prior purchases by the defendant. The
plaintiff subsequently sought to recover these pre-contractual outlays as
an element of damages for breach. The Norton court denied recovery of
those outlays, but did so through application of a standard that would
allow recovery of pre-contractual outlays in many instances:
89. 722 P.2d 1062 (Idaho 1986).
90. Id. at 1067.
91. Id.
92. See also King v. Beatrice Foods Co., 402 P.2d 966, 968 (Idaho 1965) (citing French
for the narrow proposition that "[t]he injured party may recover the reasonable expense
which he has incurred in anticipation of performance").
93. 183 A.2d 230 (Vt. 1962).
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Damages resulting to a plaintiff, for failure to meet the terms of a
contract... before contractual relations existed with the defendant,
and of which agreement defendant had no knowledge, are not the
direct and natural results of a breach.... [The pre-contractual ex-
penditure] was not a circumstance known to the defendant, nor one
which could reasonably be supposed to have been in its contempla-
tion at the time it contracted with the plaintiff. It was a circumstance
which was not considered by both parties when the contract was
made which was necessary for it to bring it within the rule of
damages.94
The Norton opinion thus lends support to the view that pre-contractual
expenditures may be recoverable if their wastage in the event of breach is
in the reasonable contemplation of both parties to the contract at the
time of formation.
Finally, in Coastland Corp. v. Third National Mortgage Co.95 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a plaintiff developer to recover one-half
of its pre-contractual outlays for architectural, engineering and attorney
fees when the defendant lender failed to honor the terms of a permanent
financing commitment.96 After noting that a party in breach was liable
for such damages as are the "reasonable and natural consequences of the
breach under the circumstances so disclosed and as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties," 97 the court
allowed recovery, stating:
[Defendant] was provided with documentation at the time Coastland
applied for construction and permanent financing that included
Coastland's expected total expenditures for architectural, engineer-
ing and legal services.... Consequently, [defendant] was aware that
those expenses were or would be incurred by Coastland and, further,
that a breach of its commitment to provide the construction financ-
ing might cause Coastland to suffer damages in the amount ex-
pended for such services.... In light of the above, we do not think
the district court erred in including expenditures made by Coastland
prior to the time the construction financing commitment was given
when awarding Coastland one-half of the expenses it incurred in
preparation for the construction of the project .... 98
In summary, there is a line of United States case law extending back
over a century that supports the position that pre-contractual expendi-
tures may not be recovered as an element of reliance damages. There
also exists, however, a second and more recent line of cases, also having
94. Id. at 236.
95. 611 F.2d 969, 979 (4th Cir. 1979).
96. Id. at 979. It is not entirely clear why the Coastland court elected to allow recovery
of precisely one-half of the pre-contractual expenditures, rather than all of them or none of
them. The lower court had allowed Coastland Corporation to recover one-half of its antic-
ipated profits under the contract, as well as one-half of the pre-contractual expenditures.
Id. at 978. That award of one-half of the lost profits was reversed on appeal, but the award
of one half of the pre-contractual expenditures was allowed to stand. Id. at 979.




discernible nineteenth-century roots but commencing essentially with the
1932 Security Stove opinion, that embraces the contrary position that such
expenditures may under certain circumstances be recoverable.
V. AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR RESOLVING CLAIMS
FOR PRE-CONTRACTUAL EXPENDITURES
A. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR A STANDARD
If one accepts the argument that some categories of pre-contractual
expenditures should, at least under some circumstances, be recoverable
as part of a reliance damages award, then the question becomes one of
determining the appropriate standard for making those decisions. A
number of reasonable candidates appear to be available for use as a crite-
rion. Let me briefly describe six of the more appealing alternatives,
which I will then discuss and compare.
i) The plaintiff could be limited to recovering his pre-contractual con-
veyancing and title investigation expenses in the context of breaches of
real estate contracts. This is the standard long embraced by the Hanslip-
Wallington line of English cases. 99 Let me call this narrow criterion the
"Conveyancing Expenses" standard.
ii) As a somewhat broader principle of recovery, the plaintiff could be
permitted to recover not only the above-noted conveyancing expenses,
but also those pre-contractual expenses incurred in performing duties
that were ultimately required under the subsequent contract, whether or
not the contract involved the conveyance of real estate. This is the stan-
dard embraced by the Lloyd v. Stanbury'0° opinion, if that case is read
broadly enough to extend to cover pre-contractual expenditures made
outside of the real estate context, but not so broadly so as to extend to
expenditures not subsequently required by the contract. Let me call this
criterion the "Required Expenditures" standard. 101
iii) As an even more expansive standard, the plaintiff could be allowed
to recover all of his pre-contractual expenditures related to the contract
that occurred after the parties had reached complete agreement on all of
the terms of the contract, but before the formalities of execution had
been completed. No court of which I am aware has yet embraced this
particular standard. Let me call this criterion the "Full Informal Agree-
ment" standard.
iv) Closely related to the above standard would be a slightly more lib-
eral standard that would allow recovery of pre-contractual expenditures
99. Hanslip v. Padwick, 5 Ex. 615, 155 Eng. Rep. 269 (1850); Wallington v. Townsend,
1 Ch. 588 (1939).
100. 1 W.L.R. 535 (1971).
101. This is the standard endorsed by the New Zealand commentator David Grinlinton
in his article on the subject: "[T]here is no justification in principle or practice to extend
the law of damages in contracts for the sale of land to pre-contractual expenditure beyond




once the parties had reached substantial agreement on the major terms of
their contract, even when further negotiation of subsidiary terms took
place before a formal contract was entered into. Let me call this criterion
the "Substantial Agreement" standard. 102
v) More expansively yet, the plaintiff could be allowed to recover all of
his pre-contractual expenditures that were, at the moment of contract for-
mation, within the reasonable contemplation of the parties as losses that
the plaintiff would bear if the contract was breached. This is the standard
adopted by the Anglia court and by subsequent courts that have followed
that opinion.' 0 3 Let me call this criterion the "Reasonable Contempla-
tion" standard.
vi) Finally, and most expansively, the plaintiff could be allowed to re-
cover all pre-contractual expenditures that were related in any way to the
contract subsequently breached. Let me call this very broad criterion the
"Contract-Related" standard.
Recovery of pre-contractual expenditures under any of these standards
would presumably be subject to the usual avoidability, 04 foreseeabil-
ity,105 and reasonable certainty10 6 limitations on damages. Furthermore,
any of these standards would apply only as a "default rule"; the parties
would be free to substitute an alternative regime for allocating damages
in the event of breach should they elect to do so in their agreement.' 0 7 In
addition, any recovery should continue to be subject to the generally ac-
cepted "losing contract" limitation that mandates that a reliance damages
recovery may not exceed the size of the plaintiff's hypothetical expecta-
tion interest-based recovery, but must be reduced by the amount of any
losses that would have resulted under the contract if fully performed.'
08
B. ADVANTAGES OF THE "REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION"
STANDARD
The first two of these six alternatives seem clearly to be inferior means
of facilitating fully compensatory reliance damages awards. The very re-
102. Such a standard has been suggested by the British commentator A. I. Ogus. OGUS,
supra note 2, at 349-50; see also Ogus, supra note 43. Ogus has been critical of the Anglia
decision: "The award in Anglia Television v. Reed is unsatisfactory in that it is consistent
neither with reliance interest compensation nor with expectation interest compensation but
reveals an unhappy confusion between the two." Ogus, supra note 43, at 426.
103. Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed, 1 Q.B. 60 (C.A. 1972) (Eng.); C.C.C. Films
(London) Ltd. v. Impact Quadrant Films Ltd., 1 Q.B. 16 (1985) (Eng.); Fieling v. Newell,
1986 Outer House Cases (Sess. Nov. 28, 1986) (Scot.) (LEXIS Intlaw Library, Scocas file);
O'Connell v. Hay, Dunedin Registry, A. 48/82 (Feb. 4, 1983) (N.Z.), cited in MacLauchlan,
supra note 43, at 360.
104. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 896.
105. Id. at 912.
106. Id. at 921-22.
107. It does, however, appear unlikely that in practice very many contracting parties
would elect to spend the time necessary to specify in their agreement what damages were
to be awarded in the relatively unlikely event that a reviewing court would choose to
award reliance damages rather than expectation damages, particularly with regard to the
recoverability of pre-contractual outlays.
108. JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, CoNTRAcrs 604 (3d ed. 1987).
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strictive Conveyancing Expenses standard is too narrow to apply in most
instances where a conventional reliance damages award limited to post-
contractual expenditures would undercompensate the plaintiff. Even in
those few cases where it might apply, it would generally provide only a
relatively small amount of additional compensation that is likely to be
insufficient to offset significantly the consequences of disregard of the
value of post-contractual forgone opportunities. The Required Expenses
standard, while being of somewhat broader applicability than the Con-
veyancing Expenses standard, is still very narrow in scope, and also would
not apply in the large majority of instances in which pre-contractual ex-
penses were incurred.
The Full Informal Agreement standard also has major shortcomings. It
does have the advantage of being grounded in a modest and intuitively
appealing extension of traditional reliance principles: that the promisee
has the right to commence relying upon the promisor's commitment once
all of its terms are clearly established, and need not await the completion
of the mere formalities of execution. The main difficulty with this stan-
dard, however, is again that it is potentially under-inclusive. It would op-
erate to deny recovery where the expenditures occurred prior to an
agreement, or even after the parties have reached essential agreement on
all major terms, but where some minor points of disagreement remain to
be negotiated.
The under-inclusiveness problem of the Full Informal Agreement stan-
dard could be partially avoided by use of the Substantial Agreement stan-
dard. That standard would allow recovery for pre-contractual
expenditures once the parties have informally assented to a core agree-
ment on essential terms. It would not, however, allow recovery for ex-
penditures made in anticipation of an agreement but before the core
terms of that agreement were informally in place. 109 It thus also is poten-
tially under-inclusive. 110 In addition, it would be difficult to develop con-
sistent guidelines as to which terms of a contract qualified as "major"
terms that must be agreed to before pre-contractual expenditures could
be recoverable.
The Contract-Related standard, while it would certainly be of very
broad applicability, has a serious disadvantage in that it would necessitate
a difficult and detailed inquiry into the plaintiff's pre-contractual con-
duct. It would be quite an undertaking to ascertain which of the plain-
tiff's overhead and other general expenses were "related to" the subject
contract and therefore recoverable. Moreover, any such expenditures
would be subject to the usual Hadley v. Baxendale "-based limitation
that they be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time of con-
tracting as losses that would likely result from breach. Given this foresee-
ability limitation on recovery, the Contract-Related standard would, in
109. McLauchlan, supra note 43, at 354.
110. Id
111. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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practice, be reduced to the more restrictive Reasonable Contemplation
standard. This being the case, it would be more sensible to utilize that
latter standard directly, and thus avoid the need for engaging in a point-
less inquiry into the nature of the plaintiff's pre-contractual overhead
costs and other such expenditures.
The Reasonable Contemplation standard seems to me to be by far the
most appealing option. First, it has an attractive normative foundation.
The standard is implicitly based upon the principle that even though pre-
contractual expenditures do not occur in reliance upon the later-formed
contract, at the moment of contracting those expenditures are irrevocably
committed to the objective of contract performance by the plaintiff, and
will subsequently be wasted if the contract is breached (subject to any
available mitigation opportunities). This is generally understood by both
parties as one of the consequences of entering into the agreement. In
other words, while the pre-contractual expenditures are not made in reli-
ance upon the contract per se, the commitment of the expenditures to the
contract and their subsequent wastage upon breach do occur in reliance
upon the agreement. 112 The pre-contractual expenditures become
thereby incorporated into the domain of post-contractual compensable
reliance behavior by dint of their reasonably foreseeable conversion into
wasted expenditures upon breach.
Second, this standard seems broad enough to apply to many kinds of
pre-contractual expenditures. It thus promises to mitigate the reliance
damages undercompensation problem in a substantial proportion of the
cases in which that problem arises. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
this standard seems to mesh quite well with existing limitations as to the
scope of application of a principle of recovery. There is obviously a very
close parallel between this standard and the "reasonable foreseeability"
limitation on liability for consequential damages deriving from Hadley v.
Baxendale.1 3 Just as the defendant is liable under the Hadley-based law
only for those possible future consequences of breach that are reasonably
foreseeable to him at the time of contracting, he would under the Rea-
sonable Contemplation standard be liable for only those pre-contractual
expenditures for which he can reasonably foresee at the time of con-
tracting that they will be wasted in the event of breach. While the fore-
seeability limitation would here apply to already-incurred expenditures
rather than to possible future consequential losses, the manner of applica-
tion of this limitation would be precisely analogous, and all of the juris-
prudence of foreseeability limitations could be applied without significant
alteration. Moreover, the Reasonable Contemplation standard would
also operate as a useful "information-forcing" default rule that facilitates
112. For further elaboration of this argument, see McLauchlan, supra note 43, at 355-
56.
113. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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communication during negotiations in the same fashion as does the fore-
seeability limitation.114
The avoidability principle denying recovery for losses that could have
been avoided without undue burden after breach could also be directly
applied under this standard. That principle would be applied here so as
to focus on whether the pre-contractual expenditures could have been
devoted to a beneficial alternative use, once the promisee learned of the
promisor's breach. Such an analysis would exactly parallel the standard
inquiry concerning the avoidability of post-contractual expenditures, or
concerning the prospects for salvage of post-contractual expenditures, in
which courts now engage.
The reasonable certainty limitation on recoveries would likely not have
significant effect here, since the pre-contractual expenditures will usually
be adequately documented. If, however, one were to define the Reason-
able Contemplation standard more broadly to be inclusive of compensa-
tion for the value of pre-contractually forgone opportunities, that
certainty limitation would then have considerable bite. As previously dis-
cussed, the usual context in which reliance damages are sought is where
the expected profits under the breached contract cannot be established
with the requisite degree of certainty, 115 and courts have shown an ex-
treme unwillingness to attempt to value and compensate for post-contrac-
tually lost opportunities in that context." 6 Given this fact, it seems
unlikely that a plaintiff could establish the value of pre-contractually for-
gone opportunities with the required degree of certainty.117 The Reason-
able Contemplation standard, even if it nominally covered pre-
contractually forgone opportunities, would in all likelihood be applied to
allow recovery only of documented pre-contractual expenditures."18
Given that the certainty limitations would preclude recovery of the value
of the forgone opportunities, I have elected to expressly limit my pro-
posed Reasonable Contemplation standard to pre-contractual
expenditures.
The express exclusion of recovery of the value of pre-contractually for-
gone opportunities from the proposed standard may seem somewhat in-
congruous, given that forgone opportunities are economically equivalent
to expenditures, and given that the proposal is motivated by the failure of
courts to compensate for forgone post-contractual opportunities in reli-
ance damages awards. However, while the argument made in this article
is premised upon the need to find an adequate proxy measure to substi-
114. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97-100 (1989).
115. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 928.
116. Pettit, supra note 1, at 457.
117. But see Ash v. Victor Enters., Auckland Registry, A. 591/70 (Aug. 5, 1974) (N.Z.)
(Coola, J.), cited in McLaughlan, supra note 43, at 357, and discussed supra at text accom-
panying notes 50-53, where the value of the pre-contractually forgone receipts were estab-
lished with certainty.
118. See id., where the court elected not to apply the rationale of Anglia to allow recov-
ery of the value of pre-contractually forgone receipts.
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tute for the uncertain value of post-contractually forgone opportunities,
and proposes using certain pre-contractual expenditures as that proxy
measure, no similar maneuver seems possible to deal with the analogous
lack-of-certainty problem that would arise if other pre-contractual con-
duct is considered. In other words, while a reasonable proxy measure
appears to be available for the value of post-contractual lost opportuni-
ties-the "reasonably contemplated as wasted in the event of breach"
pre-contractual expenditures-no comparable expenditure measure ap-
pears to be available that might suffice as a proxy measure for the value
of the pre-contractually forgone opportunities. As a result, I have elected
to exclude recovery of the value of pre-contractually forgone opportuni-
ties from my proposal. This exclusion admittedly limits the ability of the
Reasonable Compensation standard to offset the systematic undercom-
pensation problem inherent in conventional reliance damage awards. I
do not, however, see any better way to address this problem without
wholly departing from existing judicial precedent and engaging in a more
radical re-examination of the certainty limitations themselves, a task
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The question remains, even given all of the limitations incorporated by
the Reasonable Contemplation standard, whether it still might apply per-
versely in some circumstances so as to overcompensate the plaintiff, rela-
tive to what he would have recovered under a theoretically sound
reliance damages award that included directly the value of post-contrac-
tually forgone opportunities. Would this standard ever work to overcom-
pensate a plaintiff by allowing him to recover pre-contractual
expenditures in excess of the value of post-contractual forgone opportu-
nities that are overlooked in current reliance damages awards? This pos-
sibility seems to me to be rather remote. In most instances the plaintiff
will likely be able to document only a relatively small sum of pre-contrac-
tual expenditures that are wasted as a reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of breach. This sum is likely to be significantly less than the value
of opportunities forgone in post-contractual reliance upon the contract.
Moreover, overcompensation is even less likely to occur when the recov-
ery allowed is compared to the plaintiff's expectation interest. It is rare
that a party to a contract does not reasonably expect the contract to yield
proceeds at least sufficient to cover his contract-related pre- and post-
contractual expenditures. A plaintiff will not usually regard it as a wind-
fall gain to recover merely his documented expenditures in a successful
action for breach, and will generally view a reliance interest-based recov-
ery, even if it is augmented by allowance of pre-contractual expenditures,
as a poor substitute for the loss of profits that would have been recovered
had his expectation interest been protected.
Finally, any recovery calculated under this standard will presumably be
subject to the usual "losing contract" limitation that a reliance damages
award may not exceed the hypothetical expectation recovery, i.e., must
be reduced by the amount of any losses that the plaintiff would have in-
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curred under the contract. 19 This limitation will serve to prevent promis-
ees from using this new doctrine to shift responsibility for the burden of
losing contracts onto breaching promisors.
In summary, the Reasonable Contemplation standard appears to pro-
vide a workable means for mitigating to some substantial extent the prob-
lem of systematic undercompensation exhibited by conventional reliance
damage awards, without going to the other extreme of overcompensating
promisees. 120 It will certainly reduce the size of the reliance damages
undercompensation gap more effectively than would use of any of the
other alternative standards here considered, and would do so in a mea-
sured fashion harnessed by the entire body of jurisprudence of recovery
limitations so far developed to avoid awarding overcompensation in vari-
ous contexts. Let me now briefly reassess the Commonwealth and Amer-
ican case law on this issue in light of this proposed standard.
C. RECONSIDERATION OF THE CASE LAW IN LIGHT OF THE
REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION STANDARD
1. The Commonwealth Cases
The application of the Reasonable Contemplation standard in the pre-
1971 cases that denied recovery of pre-contractual expenditures would
almost certainly have changed their results. The recovery of pre-contrac-
tual title investigation and conveyancing expenses that was allowed in the
Hanslip and Wallington conveyancing expenses exception cases would
also have been allowed had those cases been decided under the Reason-
able Contemplation standard, but the anachronistic limitation of recovery
to the real estate conveyance context would be discarded.
With regard to Lloyd and Anglia and the subsequent cases that have
followed those precedents to allow recovery, use of the Reasonable Con-
templation standard would yield results identical to those actually
reached, but would in some instances ground those holdings upon a more
satisfactory rationale. The pre-contractual expenditures that were subse-
quently required by the contract and that were allowed as an element of
the recovery by the Lloyd court would certainly be regarded as being in
the reasonable contemplation of the parties wasted upon breach as much
as would be any post-contractual reliance expenditures., The Anglia
119. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 108, at 604.
120. In full accord with this conclusion is the New Zealand scholar D. W. McLauchlan:
[T]he real issue . . . is whether the basic rule of contract damages that a
plaintiff is entitled to recover in respect of losses caused by the breach which
are within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the con-
tract can be satisfied in the case of the pre-contract expenditure .... There
can be no justification for treating pre-contract expenditure any differently
from post-contract expenditure.
McLauchlan, supra note 43, at 355 (emphasis in original). "The real issue is whether such
an award [of pre-contractual expenditures] can be accommodated within the fundamental
rule of contract law damages that reasonably contemplated losses caused by a breach of




court, of course, expressly adopted the essence of the proposed Reason-
able Contemplation standard, as did the C.C. C. Films court, the Fieling v.
Newell court, and the New Zealand opinion of O'Connell v. Hay. In my
opinion the Commonwealth case law since Lloyd and Anglia, though still
somewhat sparse in extent, is clear and consistent enough to justify the
assertion that the Commonwealth courts now embrace the substance of
my proposed Reasonable Compensation standard.
2. The United States Cases
As I have discussed above, American judges are much more divided
over the issue of recovering pre-contractual expenditures than are their
Commonwealth counterparts, with the traditional "no recovery" position
now being challenged by a modest minority line of cases that allow, or at
least admit the possibility of allowing, such recovery. The precise posi-
tion embraced by this minority line of cases is not entirely clear, but it
seems roughly consistent with the Reasonable Contemplation standard.
The Security Stove court, in allowing recovery of the pre-contractual
expenditures, did not expressly embrace a broad Reasonable Contem-
plation principle of recovery, but its ruling is not inconsistent with the
application of this standard. The opinion speaks of the parties' "contem-
plation," but it uses this term to refer to the fact that the plaintiff contem-
plated that the defendant would perform his obligations, 121 and to the
fact that all parties contemplated that the plaintiff would thereby bene-
fit. 122 The term was not used in the context of the defendant contemplat-
ing the wastage of the plaintiff's pre-contractual expenditures as a
potential consequences of his breach. However, the defendant in that
case had been notified at the outset of negotiations that the plaintiff had
expended funds to rent an exhibition booth,123 and could easily foresee
the wastage of those expenditures should it fail to deliver the goods in
timely fashion. While the Security Stove court arguably would have de-
nied recovery if the case had not arisen in a common carrier context,
recovery would certainly have been allowed regardless of context had the
court applied the Reasonable Contemplation standard here proposed.
While the French court also did not speak of reasonable contemplation
of the consequences of breach, it did note that the defendant was well
aware of the plaintiff's plans to incur pre-contractual expenses. 24 That
court would in all likelihood have allowed recovery of those expenses,
and in a much clearer and less ambiguous fashion, had it applied the Rea-
sonable Contemplation standard. The later Norton and Coastland opin-
ions both expressly embraced the reasonable contemplation phrase and
underlying principles and decided the disputes on that basis.
121. Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 51 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1932).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 573.
124. French v. Nabob Silver-Lead Co., 350 P.2d 206, 207 (Idaho 1960).
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Application of the Reasonable Contemplation standard would not
have altered the outcome in Dempsey; the plaintiff would still have been
denied recovery on the basis of its failure to prove its alleged expendi-
tures. 125 This proposed standard does, however, conflict directly with the
legal principle of non-recovery of pre-contractual expenditures set forth
in Dempsey, in the long line of pre-Dempsey cases denying recovery, and
in the post-Dempsey cases such as Gruber, Hough, and Brown. Its use
would likely have changed the result in most or all of those cases.
The United States courts are split on this question, with the majority
supporting denial of recovery, and to embrace the Reasonable Contem-
plation standard one must simply reject the reasoning of the Empire-
Dempsey majority line of cases. I think that such a rejection is called for.
Those cases reflect an unreflective and wooden understanding of the con-
cept of reliance, and evidence no sensitivity whatever to the systematic
undercompensation problem caused by the application of the certainty
limitations in the reliance damages context. The Reasonable Contempla-
tion standard more than adequately addresses any legitimate concerns
raised by the allowance of recovery of pre-contractual expenditures
under the reliance interest rubric.
VI. CONCLUSION
I therefore advocate the position that pre-contractual expenditures
should be properly recoverable as reliance damages if the contract is sub-
sequently breached, so long as the fact that those expenditures would
likely be wasted in the event of breach was within the reasonable contem-
plation of the parties at the time of contract formation, and so long as the
other established limitations on recovery are honored. The value of any
pre-contractually forgone opportunities would not be recoverable under
this Reasonable Compensation standard.
There is little danger that application of this principle of expanded re-
covery would go beyond mitigating the reliance damages undercompen-
sation problem and lead to overcompensation of promisees. Recovery of
pre-contractual expenditures would be subject to the usual limitations
that those expenditures not be avoidable after breach without undue bur-
den to the plaintiff, be reasonably foreseeable to the party in breach at
the time of contracting, be proven with reasonable certainty as to
amount, and not lead to an overall recovery that would exceed what the
plaintiff would have recovered in protection of his expectation interest.
Moreover, the contracting parties would be free to opt out of this stan-
dard by agreement.
The foreseeability limitation on recovery is likely to have little if any
independent application under this proposed standard, since the substan-
tively identical reasonable contemplation requirement incorporates its
core principle. The reasonable certainty limitation is also likely to have
125. Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542, 545-46 (1932).
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little if any scope of application, given that pre-contractual expenditures
can usually be documented, and given that the proposed standard ex-
pressly excludes recovery of the usually uncertain value of pre-contractu-
ally forgone opportunities.
The avoidability limitation, in contrast, may upon occasion be quite sig-
nificant in determining what proportion of the pre-contractual expendi-
tures were in fact recognized at the time of contract formation as likely to
be wasted in the event of breach. This is particularly likely to be the case
when the act of breach follows soon after the formation of the contract.
In addition, the "losing contract" overall limitation on reliance damage
awards may upon occasion serve to disallow recovery of some or all pre-
contractual expenditures.
I think the Reasonable Contemplation standard provides a workable
means of offsetting to a significant extent the systematic undercompensa-
tion provided by current reliance damages awards. Had this standard
been applied in the relevant prior cases, it would have led to results con-
sistent with the outcomes that were reached in the more recent Common-
wealth cases, but would have grounded those results in some instances in
a more satisfying rationale. It would also have yielded results consistent
with those reached in the Security Stove line of United States cases. Its
application would have changed the legal position on this question taken
in the Dempsey opinion-though it would not have changed the outcome
of that case-and would have changed both the rationale and result
reached in the numerous earlier and later cases that have adopted the
substance of the Dempsey position. This change in the law would be a
change for the better. I recommend that the United States courts give
serious consideration to adopting the Reasonable Contemplation stan-
dard with regard to recovery of pre-contractual expenditures as an ele-
ment of reliance damages awards.
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